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Lean Organizations

Featured Article - April 2009

Toyota's British = Influence

By Bob Emiliani, The CLBM LLC =
=20

Unaware of the details of Toyota=E2=80=99s history, it=E2=80=99s = easy to think that=20 Toyota managers and workers were the originators of all the important = ideas. In=20 fact, they were the originators of some important ideas and adopters of = ideas=20 from many others=E2=80=A0=E2=80=93 most good, but a few not so good. = This article highlights one=20 idea that originated in the U.K. and which Toyota senior managers have = for=20 decades found very useful for determining the size and output of their=20 automobile plants, and for informing them when to develop new models. =

For many years I have been interested in the origins and evolution of = Lean=20 management and have recently written book chapters and papers on the = topic=20 [1-4]. During the course of my studies I have periodically come across = reference=20 made by Toyota executives and others to the Maxcy-Silberston production = cost=20 curve, invariably without attribution or with erroneous attribution. As = a=20 result, the original source for the curve had long been difficult to = locate. The=20 curve appeared in the 1959 book The Motor Industry, a landmark study of = the=20 British automotive industry from the early 1900s to 1957, written by = economists=20 George Maxcy and Aubrey Silberston [5]. Importantly, the book also = included a=20 description of how the cost curve was derived [6], which I will discuss = later.=20 Figure 1 shows the elusive Maxcy-Silberston cost curve (also known as an = =E2=80=9Cexperience curve=E2=80=9D).

Figure 1

This curve describes a quasi-empirical relationship between the total = cost=20 per unit and annual production volume for a hypothetical = =E2=80=9Cunit=E2=80=9D consisting of a=20 mix of different models of mass-market cars, vans, and trucks, = =E2=80=9Cwith varying=20 degrees of interchangeability between them,=E2=80=9D in the U.K. in the = early- to=20 mid-1950s (a high growth period). The shape of the curve suggests there = is=20 little in the way of economies of scale beyond a cumulative output of = about=20 200,000 to 250,000 units per year.

Since the late 1950s, Toyota senior executives have viewed this cost = curve as=20 helpful in guiding their thinking and decision-making with respect to = the size=20 and output of new automobile plants [7]. Taiichi Ohno accepted the=20 Maxcy-Silberston cost curve for about 15 years during Toyota=E2=80=99s = high-growth=20 (sellers=E2=80=99 market) period, from about 1958 to 1973. The = Maxcy-Silberston cost=20 curve loses relevance in slow growth (buyers=E2=80=99 market) periods, = such as what=20 Toyota started to experience after the 1973 oil shock, according to Ohno = [8].=20 While Ohno thought that Toyota=E2=80=99s Production System invalidated = or greatly=20 undercut economy of scale effects and the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve, = the=20 Maxcy-Silberston curve seems to be relevant even today to Toyota senior=20 management=E2=80=99s thinking in terms of annual factory production = output. The question=20 is, why?

In 1994 when I was a manufacturing manager at Pratt & Whitney, I = can=20 vividly recall our kaizens and the hundreds of wonderful improvements = that we=20 made to our products and processes. We were achieving for the first time = quick=20 set-ups, short or no queue times, tremendous reductions in part travel,=20 improvements in quality, etc. These kaizens, many of which were = facilitated by=20 sensei Doi Yoshihisa, then of Shingijutsu Co., Ltd., were practical and = helped=20 our business unit tremendously. I can also vividly recall meeting with = finance=20 executives each month who would project onto the screen an cost curve of = an=20 earlier product, onto which was superimposed an anticipated cost curve = for the=20 new product we were working on. I was struck by the enormous disconnect = in how=20 operations people went about reducing cost, through fundamental process=20 improvement, compared to how finance managers viewed cost reduction,=20 theoretically through economies of scale and cost curves. Their task, = unlike Mr.=20 Doi=E2=80=99s task, was to drive us to hit points on a simplistic,=20 arbitrarily-determined cost curve. The dissonance was jarring and = unforgettable.=20

In 1999 sensei Doi came to Hartford, Connecticut, from Yokohama, = Japan, to=20 facilitate kaizens at local first-tier aerospace suppliers. Production = cost=20 curves were still on my mind five years later, and so I asked him at = dinner one=20 night what he thought of the relationship between cost and production = volume. I=20 asked Mr. Doi this question in part because it was conspicuously absent = from the=20 early Lean production and Lean accounting literature [9] and I thought = he might=20 know why. Almost before I could finish asking the question, sensei = sternly=20 admonished me =E2=80=93 actually rapping me on the head with his = knuckles =E2=80=93 telling me=20 that it was not the right way to think. Instead, Mr. Doi said people = must think=20 this way: If a manufacturer expects to meet customers=E2=80=99 = expectations with respect=20 to prices in competitive markets, then costs must decline as a function = of time,=20 not volume, by improving designs and processes from beginning to end. He = drew a=20 sketch on the placemat to explain what he meant and it made perfect = sense, but I=20 still had questions.

For many years I had viewed the type of cost-volume relationship = expressed in=20 the Maxcy-Silberston curve as fundamentally flawed because it promotes=20 overproduction (under any market condition). However, I remained curious = as to=20 why this relationship was conspicuously absent from the Lean literature = written=20 by Japanese authors in the 1980s and 1990s =E2=80=93 it was not even = directly refuted=20 until the onset of the post 1973 slow-growth period cited by Ohno [8]. = It was as=20 if the cost-volume relationship was so obviously a stupid way to think = that it=20 was not even worth mentioning in any of the most important books. Yet it = shaped=20 the thinking of Toyota executives for decades, and apparently = successfully so.=20 Again, the question is why?

The Maxcy-Silberston production cost curve keeps popping up, most = recently in=20 the 2006 book, Inside the Mind of Toyota, by Satoshi Hino [10], and in = Masaaki=20 Sato=E2=80=99s 2008 book The Toyota Leaders [11]. Hino says that the = Maxcy-Silberston=20 cost curve is still relevant to Toyota management after almost 50 years. = He says=20 that the value of the curve to Toyota senior managers is different. To = most=20 executives, the cost curve says they should seek to increase the annual=20 production volume of a factory from 200,000 to 1,000,000 units to = maximize=20 economies of scale and achieve the lowest possible production costs. To = Toyota=20 mangers, the curve suggested something different: that = =E2=80=9C=E2=80=A6it would be more=20 profitable to increase overall sales by developing new = models=E2=80=A6=E2=80=9D [12].

From Toyota=E2=80=99s viewpoint, producing more than 250,000 vehicles = was ill-advised=20 because there was little additional cost savings to be had from economy = of scale=20 effects. So instead of focusing on securing the last drop of cost = savings, they=20 should determine what other products customers want and manufacture new = models=20 that satisfy those needs. This unique view of the Maxcy-Silberston cost = curve=20 helped Toyota become a full-line automaker and grow to become an = industry=20 leader.

The cost curve was originally created by Maxcy and Silberston to = provide=20 guidance to British auto industry executives, which at that time = consisted of=20 five major companies: British Motor Corporation, Ford, Rootes, Standard, = and=20 Vauxhall. Its purpose was to give the executives an estimate of the = expected=20 reductions in cost per unit that could be achieved if annual production = volumes=20 were increased. This information provided an indication of the future = growth=20 potential at the level of the firm and of the industry as a whole.

In the late 1940s through the mid-1950s, each British motor company = produced=20 50,000 to 200,000 vehicles per year, where the volume of popular models = ranged=20 from 50,000 to 100,000 per year. The Maxcy-Silberston automobile = production cost=20 curve showed that doubling or tripling production volume would yield = large cost=20 savings. The British motor industry thus had considerable room for = growth,=20 according to the economists, as sales would surely grow as costs and = prices=20 fell.

The economists were telling British auto executives that growth, and=20 therefore future success (and survival), is best achieved by becoming = more=20 supply-driven; to overproduce. That is, they should become more = aggressively=20 supply-driven (e.g. 30% supply-driven, 70% demand-driven) where a larger = supply=20 of vehicles at lower prices will create greater demand, versus relying = on=20 customer demand for vehicles at current prices to create the necessary = supply=20 (e.g. 10% supply-driven, 90% demand-driven) =E2=80=93 which is what the = British motor=20 industry had largely done for much of its early existence. Expanding the = supply=20 of existing vehicles and creating new vehicles, however, consumes = financial and=20 other resources necessary for improving auto parts, creating new = automotive=20 technologies, and updating established products to help ensure long-term = survival. So there is risk in being supply-driven, and it is not solely = related=20 to the cost of new products and expanded inventories.

The Maxcy-Silberston cost curve graphically supports the argument for = automakers to focus more on economies of scale and become more = supply-driven.=20 However, the data used to generate the curve was based on two flimsy = pieces of=20 information: =E2=80=9Cthe small amount of available [published] = quantitative evidence=E2=80=9D=20 and estimates from one major U.K. automobile company =E2=80=9Cbased = solely on an=20 opinion=E2=80=9D [13]. That major U.K. automobile company from which the = opinion came=20 was probably British Motor Corporation Ltd., formed in a 1952 merger of = Morris=20 Motors Ltd. and Austin Motor Company, Ltd.

It is astonishing that Toyota executives would put so much faith in = the=20 Maxcy-Silberston cost curve given: 1) how it was derived; 2) the fact = that it=20 was a rough estimate, a simple model used to describe complex = inter-connected=20 relationships; and 3) that it was rooted in batch-and-queue processing = and=20 standard cost accounting [14]. Note how the neatly drawn continuous line = in=20 Figure 1 deceptively suggests rigorous research and precise data [15]. =

The Maxcy-Silberston cost curve informed Toyota executives on many = decisions,=20 each costing hundreds of millions of dollars. Apparently = Toyota=E2=80=99s own cost=20 accounting data post-1965 validated the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve = sufficiently=20 well to warrant its continued use even as growth slowed after 1973. In = addition,=20 Toyota=E2=80=99s unique interpretation of the curve has apparently = served it well for=20 several decades [16] compared to competitors who unwisely sought to = produce=20 larger and larger volumes as the principal means to reduce costs. This = expansion=20 of volume and associated investments proved to be a mistake once = consumer=20 markets began to diversify, competition increased, and growth slowed. =

While in Ohno=E2=80=99s view the Toyota Production System eliminates = the need for=20 scale [8], other Toyota senior executives, one after another, apparently = saw a=20 need for scale to drive down costs [17]. However, the flaw that is built = into=20 the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve is that it compels company executives to = authorize producing too many of one product, to produce too many = different=20 products, or to do both, resulting in gluts of supply, especially in = contracting=20 markets. Management commitment to the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve = eventually=20 leads to a systemic breakdown of discipline needed to fulfill actual = customer=20 demand at the required price [18]. It seems that however the = Maxcy-Silberston=20 cost curve is interpreted, it will outlive its usefulness sooner or = later and=20 cause a lot of trouble. Therefore, it is not a valid model for executive = decision-making, even if the data were rigorous and precise [14, 19]. = Toyota=20 finally fell victim to the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve in 2008, having=20 experienced less severe problems with it in the late 1980s and early = 1990s [20].=20

So what now? It would not make sense for Toyota to continue to pursue = a=20 dubious representation of economies of scale (Figure 1), even when = economic=20 conditions improve, because it will only lead to a repetition of errors. = What=20 Toyota (and others) can do is de-emphasize economies of scale thinking = and=20 totally eliminate the use of production cost curves. A return to its=20 long-standing policy of stable long-term growth (3-5% per year), from = which it=20 deviated between 1998-2008, would be helpful, as would supplying to = actual=20 customer demand. The way to do that is to focus on achieving flow [21] = as Frank=20 Woollard did in the 1920s [4] and Taiichi Ohno [8] did in 1970s. (Note = that=20 achieving flow in sellers=E2=80=99 markets improves gross profit = margins, so the=20 rationale for pursuing flow transcends any specific market condition). =

Figure 2 shows why achieving flow is so important: it removes the = deep bend=20 at the start of the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve [14]. The decline in = cost in the=20 Woollard-Ohno curve is due to a huge reduction in time =E2=80=93 = principally set-up=20 time, queue time, and transportation time =E2=80=93 not an increase in = volume. The=20 positive impact on both profitability and competitiveness is obvious. =

Figure 2

The Woollard-Ohno production cost curve is a =E2=80=9Cflow cost = curve,=E2=80=9D while the=20 Maxcy-Silberston cost curve is better characterized as a =E2=80=9Cscale = cost curve=E2=80=9D=20 [22]. Flow is what manufacturers (and service providers) should strive = to=20 achieve through disciplined market feedback and analysis, design to = target=20 costs, production preparation, production, and production improvement=20 activities, inclusive of the thorough elimination of waste, unevenness, = and=20 unreasonableness.

The Woollard-Ohno flow cost curve suggests to executives that = overproduction=20 of popular models to achieve cost savings is not worth pursuing. That is = a=20 significant improvement over the Maxcy-Silberston scale cost curve. = However, it=20 could still suggest to senior managers that they authorize production of = many=20 different products. One must be on guard for this possible = interpretation [23],=20 because it will surely lead to higher costs though excessive product = line=20 differentiation =E2=80=93 such as Toyota building numerous models of low = mileage=20 vehicles for the North American market.

This article highlights just one example of how Toyota senior = managers were=20 influenced by non-U.S. automakers. My research shows that Ford Motor = Company was=20 one of many automakers that influenced Toyota, and it may not have even = been the=20 most significant overall. Toyota was influenced in many different and = more=20 positive ways by British [4] and continental European automakers [24] = (not=20 economists), whose customers were more like Toyota=E2=80=99s in terms of = wants and=20 needs, and whose factories were on a smaller scale that Toyota could = more easily=20 learn from [25]. This would have been much more relevant to Toyota from = 1935 to=20 the late 1950s compared to Ford=E2=80=99s customers and Ford=E2=80=99s = expansive, vertically=20 integrated production facilities.

___________

Notes
=E2=80=A0 One of Toyota=E2=80=99s great accomplishment has = been in putting these=20 ideas together to create a beautifully integrated management system, = steadily=20 improving it day-by-day, and then maintaining commitment to the system = through=20 generations of managers. However, it is clear they have stumbled badly = in recent=20 years. Their self-imposed high growth period from 1998-2008 seems to be = the key=20 factor that has led to numerous problems that will be difficult to=20 correct.
[1] M.L. Emiliani, =E2=80=9CThe Origins of Lean Management = in America: The=20 Role of Connecticut Businesses,=E2=80=9D Journal of Management History, = Vol. 12, No. 2,=20 2006, pp. 167-184
[2] B. Emiliani, REAL LEAN: Critical Issues and=20 Opportunities in Lean Management, Volume Two, The CLBM, LLC, = Wethersfield,=20 Conn., 2007, Chapters 1-4 and 10
[3] B. Emiliani, REAL LEAN: The Keys = to=20 Sustaining Lean Management, Volume Three, The CLBM, LLC, Wethersfield, = Conn.,=20 2008
[4] F. Woollard with B. Emiliani, Principles of Mass and Flow=20 Production, The CLBM, LLC, Wethersfield, Conn., 2009
[5] G. Maxcy and = A.=20 Silberston, The Motor Industry, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, = U.K.,=20 1959, p. 94 (Figure 2). Used with permission. The shape of the curve is=20 approximately that of a 90% experience curve, which means there is a 10% = reduction in cost each time cumulative production volume is doubled. = This is the=20 book that led me (Emiliani) to Frank G. Woollard=E2=80=99s = long-forgotten work in flow=20 production in the 1920s British automotive industry. See note = [4].
[6] Maxcy=20 and Silberston, pp.86-93 and 98
[7] The book Toyota: A History of the = First=20 50 Years (Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota City, Japan, 1988), lists on = page 506=20 under the heading =E2=80=9CGeneral Studies=E2=80=9D a reference to G. = Maxcy and A. Silberston=E2=80=99s=20 book The Motor Industry. This book was important enough to Toyota = executives to=20 be listed in the company=E2=80=99s official history.
[8] T. Ohno, = Toyota Production=20 System, Productivity Press, Portland, OR, 1988, pp. 1-2. The original = subtitle=20 to Ohno=E2=80=99s 1978 book The Toyota Production System (published in = Japanese by=20 Diamond Inc., Tokyo, Japan) was =E2=80=9CAiming to Manage Free from = Economies of Scale=E2=80=9D=20 (see Jon Miller=E2=80=99s explanations of the subtitle at=20 http://www.gembapantarei.com/2007/06/10_common_misconceptions_about.html = and=20 http://www.gembapantarei.com/2009/01/the_toyota_production_system_by_taii= chi_ohno_chapt.html).=20 Ohno thought Toyota=E2=80=99s Production System invalidated or greatly = undercut economy=20 of scale thinking and the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve due to the = dramatic=20 reduction in set-up time, queue time, transportation time, etc., as a = result of=20 achieving flow.
[9] See Yasuhiro Monden=E2=80=99s books on operations = and cost=20 management in the Japanese automotive industry, for example.
[10] S. = Hino,=20 Inside the Mind of Toyota, Productivity Press, New York, NY, 2006, pp.=20 80-82
[11] M. Sato, The Toyota Leaders, Vertical Inc., New York, NY, = 2008, p.=20 148
[12] Hino, pp. 80-82
[13] Maxcy and Silberston, p. 88
[14] = The=20 empirical studies conducted by The Boston Consulting Group in the = mid-1960s to=20 validate the experience curve are flawed because it reflects nothing = more than=20 the widespread practice of batch-and-queue processing and standard cost=20 accounting (and under the narrow conditions that they examined, where = product or=20 industry growth rates were very high and prices were set by management; = i.e.=20 sellers=E2=80=99 market, price =3D cost + profit). See Perspectives on = Experience, The=20 Boston Consulting Group, Inc., Boston, MA, 1972. Confusion has arisen = because=20 the human experience of learning a new task can produce a similarly = shaped=20 curve. The Maxcy-Silberston automobile production cost curve and The = Boston=20 Consulting Group=E2=80=99s misnamed experience curve are identical, and = both are=20 independent of the growth rate of the firm or industry. The proper name = for=20 these would be the =E2=80=9Cbatch-and-queue curve,=E2=80=9D as distinct = from the =E2=80=9Chuman=20 experience curve.=E2=80=9D The reason why Ohno viewed a firm=E2=80=99s = growth rate as relevant=20 to the Maxcy-Silberston automobile production cost curve is as follows: = High=20 growth amortizes waste, unevenness, and unreasonableness rapidly over a = large=20 volume of goods produced in a short period of time at prices set by the=20 manufacturer (i.e. sellers=E2=80=99 market), which customers are willing = to pay. When=20 conditions reverse and a buyers=E2=80=99 market emerges, customers are = no longer willing=20 to pay the prices set by manufacturers, nor are they willing to pay for=20 activities that add cost but do not add value. Therefore, = Toyota=E2=80=99s production=20 (and overall management) system, which seeks to eliminate waste, = unevenness, and=20 unreasonableness, undercuts the need for scale that would otherwise be = necessary=20 to enable a manufacturer to produce goods at low cost. In other words, = the need=20 for scale in operations diminishes as the amount of waste, unevenness, = and=20 unreasonableness diminish and flow improves (see Figure 2). Frank G. = Woollard=20 recognized this effect when he established flow production at Morris = Motors Ltd.=20 (like Toyota, in vertically disintegrated production =E2=80=93 which is = very different=20 than the vertically integrated Ford Model T production at Highland Park) = in the=20 mid-1920s (see note [4]).
[15] In his 1960 review of the book The = Motor=20 Industry, John B. Rae wrote that =E2=80=9C=E2=80=A6[the = author=E2=80=99s] work is excellent; their book=20 can be rated as indispensable.=E2=80=9D In the chapter analyzing the = economies of mass=20 production (Chapter 6, pp. 75-98), Professor Rae said: = =E2=80=9C=E2=80=A6[the chapter] is done=20 with a thoroughness that has not to my knowledge been applied to the = American=20 automobile industry.=E2=80=9D This illustrates how even skilled book = reviewers can miss=20 important details. See J.B. Rae, =E2=80=9CBook review of The Motor = Industry by G. Maxcy=20 and A. Silberston,=E2=80=9D The Economic History Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, = 1960, pp.=20 132-133.
[16] It appears Toyota continues to use the = Maxcy-Silberston=20 automobile production cost curve =E2=80=93 created in the era of = mechanical vehicles=20 powered by internal combustion engines made using 1950s production = technology =E2=80=93=20 in this new era of electro-mechanical vehicles powered by gas-electric = hybrid,=20 electric, and hydrogen systems made using contemporary production=20 technologies.
[17] This view may be driven by the capital intensive = nature of=20 automobile production and the widespread use of standard cost = accounting.=20
[18] Success breeds complacency, and what better measure of success = is there=20 than higher sales?
[19] To understand the madness that can occur = when top=20 executives become fully possessed by the spell of economies of scale = thinking,=20 you must read =E2=80=9CThe Mega Containers Invade,=E2=80=9D John W. = Miller, The Wall Street=20 Journal, 26 January 2009. This is one example of what I call a = =E2=80=9Cdurable=E2=80=9D error.=20 It is the type of error in management thinking that survives for decades = through=20 generations of managers.
[20] T. Fujimoto, The Evolution of a = Manufacturing=20 System at Toyota, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1999, pp.=20 206-222
[21] Achieve flow not just in production, but in all = activities in=20 the enterprise, in a non-zero-sum fashion, consistent with the = =E2=80=9CRespect for=20 People=E2=80=9D principle.
[22] In a 1972 paper, Aubrey Silberston = provided a=20 detailed technical analysis of economies of scale (=E2=80=9Csavings of = resources=20 associated with large scale=E2=80=9D). His analysis vividly illustrates = an enormous=20 disconnect between how economists understand economies of scale compared = to the=20 simplistic manner in which executives comprehend and seek economies of = scale.=20 Unfortunately, the paper is also rich with so many qualifications, and = misses=20 key factors which can lead to diseconomies of scale (or the inability to = save=20 resources), that it renders the economies of scale argument as = practically=20 useless =E2=80=93 details which executives are typically unaware of. = Also, Silberston=20 erroneously thought that all economies contributed to scale or were = scalable.=20 See A. Silberston, =E2=80=9CEconomies of Scale in Theory and = Practice,=E2=80=9D The Economic=20 Journal, Vol. 82, No. 325, March 1972, pp. 369-391.
[23] Eiji Toyoda, = the=20 former chairman of Toyota Motor Corporation, was a principal advocate of = the=20 Maxcy-Silberston production cost curve. Despite his enthusiasm for the = curve,=20 Mr. Toyoda seemed to be aware that it could suggest to senior managers = that they=20 authorize production of many different products. In a 1998 interview of = Eiji=20 Toyoda, Takahiro Fujimoto asked the question: =E2=80=9CWhat was your = rule of thumb for=20 deciding when to build a new plant? Did you have an upper limit in mind = for=20 production volume at each plant?=E2=80=9D Mr. Toyoda=E2=80=99s answer is = as follows: =E2=80=9C=E2=80=A6our basic=20 unit of production capacity is about 20,000 vehicles per month=E2=80=A6 = Twenty thousand=20 seems to be some sort of natural economic unit=E2=80=A6 you can only = sell 20,000=20 vehicles a month with each model if you have just a few models=E2=80=9D = [italics added].=20 In other words, an automaker must not produce too many models; if it = does, then=20 it cannot reach the =E2=80=9Cnatural economic unit=E2=80=9D of 20,000 = vehicles per month in=20 production. Apparently Toyota senior managers did not share Eiji = Toyoda=E2=80=99s=20 concern and thus produced too many models and created too much = production=20 capacity between approximately 1998 and 2008. Source: The Birth of Lean, = K.=20 Shimokawa and T. Fujimoto, editors, The Lean Enterprise Institute, = Cambridge,=20 MA, 2009, p. 252.
[24] Sato, pp. 132-133.
[25] One of = Toyota=E2=80=99s=20 long-standing strengths has been to gather intelligence from many = sources =E2=80=93=20 competitors, suppliers, customers, analysts, academics, etc. =E2=80=93 = carefully=20 evaluate this information, and then put it to practical use. Their study = of=20 books such as The Motor Industry and competitor=E2=80=99s products and = production=20 systems helped them become who they are today. The question is, will = some=20 information, such as the Maxcy-Silberston cost curve (the experience = curve),=20 still be useful tomorrow?
___________

M.L. =E2=80=9CBob=E2=80=9D Emiliani is President of The CLBM, LLC. = Bob worked for 20 years in=20 manufacturing and service industries, and has implemented Lean = principles and=20 practices on the manufacturing shop floor, in supply networks, and in = higher=20 education (academics). Bob has authored seven books and over 30 papers = on=20 various aspects of Lean management. Copyright =C2=A9 2009 by M.L. = =E2=80=9CBob=E2=80=9D Emiliani.=20

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